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Abstract
We analyze a credence goods market with risk averse consumers when the as-
sumptions of both liability and verifiability hold. In the basic model, we show that
the consumer’s risk-aversion would induce expert’s overtreatment behavior and thus
cause social inefficiency. But the probability of overtreating deceases with the de-
gree of consumer’s risk-aversion or the coefficient of absolute risk aversion(CARA).
Furthermore, we extend the basic model with insurance option. We assume there
exists a perfectly competitive insurance market where the consumer could purchase
insurance. Two sets of equilibria indexed by expert’s pricing strategy could be spec-
ified. The equilibrium outcome shows that social efficiency could always be achieved
and the expert could obtain all the social surplus in the equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
When the consumers need some repair services, the service providers have more informa-
tion about the consumers’ need and the corresponding treatments. The goods or services
with this property that seller knows more about buyer’s demand than the buyer himself
is credence goods (See Darby and Karni (1973)). The consumers barely know what
they need ex ante, and even can not verify whether their need is properly satisfied or not
ex post. Typical credence services are medical services, repair services and education and
consulting services.
The information superiority of service providers may induce three types of fraudulent
behaviours by sellers: 1)overtreatment, providing unnecessarily high quality of goods or
services, 2)undertreatment, providing insufficiently low quality and 3)overcharging, charg-
ing the price for quality actually unprovided. Ample anecdotes and empirical evidences
show that these three types of frauds persist in credence goods market. For instance,
Emons (1997) cite that Patterson (1992) finds that over 90% employees of Sears Automo-
tive Centers in the test cases recommend unnecessary repairs for car owners in the United
States1.
This paper focuses on the impact of the consumer’s risk-aversion on seller’s incentive
for overtreatment. We set up an otherwise credence goods model in which consumers are
risk averse and assume that the expert is liable for the treatment outcome and the types
of services provided by the seller are verifiable costlessly by consumers(Corresponding
to the assumption of liability and verifiability in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)). In
our model, one risk-averse consumer has a either minor or major problem but she does
not know exactly what her problem is, the monopolistic expert can accurately diagnose
the nature of consumer’s problem with no cost. The expert first posts a price list and
then makes a take-it-or-leave-it treatment proposal for the consumer after diagnosis. We
show that consumer’s risk aversion could induce expert’s overtreatment behaviour but the
probability of overtreatment decreases with the degree of consumer’s risk-aversion or the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion(CARA). Extremely, when the consumer is absolutely
risk-averse, the expert behaves honestly and the market efficiency can be reobtained.
We also extend the setup to a situation in which there exists a perfectly competitive
insurance market. The consumer could purchase insurance after observing the expert’s
1For more examples or evidence in details, see Emons (1997), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006), Bester and Dahm (2014)
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price list and insurance scheme posted by the insurer. We study the consumer’s optimal
insurance choice and the effect on expert’s overtreatment. Two sets of equilibria indexed
by expert’s pricing strategy could be specified. In both sets of equilibria, the consumers
would purchase insurance while the expert always honestly offer to repair consumer’s
problem. The equilibrium outcome shows that social efficiency could always be achieved
and the expert could obtain all the social surplus in the equilibrium.
Sulzle and Wambach(2005) is closely related to the problem under concern. They
study the role of consumer’s coinsurance rate on expert’s overcharing behaviors by adding
consumers’ insurance into a simplified version of credence goods model in Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky(2003). In their model, there exists many profit-maximizing experts in the
market. The experts compete for consumers and can overcharge the consumers. Searching
for second opinion is allowed for the consumer whenever he rejects an expert’s offer.
Thus the consumer’s problem is always repaired and the social inefficiency comes from
duplicately wasteful search cost. In contrast, this paper analyse a monopolistic expert
who attempts to overtreat the consumer while the consumer disciplines the expert by
rejecting expert’s treatment offer. No second opinion is allowed and social inefficiency is
due to consumer’s unrepaired problems.
Furthermore, the price for treatments in their model is fixed and exogenously given.
The expert’s strategy is only one-dimension,i.e, deciding the probability of overcharging.
As in Pesendorfer and Wolinsky(2003), they show there exists an informational externality
between expert’s strategy. If other experts prescribe relatively dishonestly, first offer for
a high diagnosis is rejected pretty often and the chance is high that a consumer visiting
a physician is already his second visit. Then the expert is more likely to prescribe a
high diagnosis as well which may confirms the first diagnosis. In the other hand, if other
experts acts pretty honestly, then the expert is also more likely to prescribe honestly. The
key role of consumer’s coinsurance rate in their model is affecting consumer’s acceptance
for first diagnosis.
But in our paper the expert decides both the prices for treatments and the probability
of overtreatment, which interacts with each other. On the one hand, a relative higher price
for major treatment create a stronger incentive for fraudulent behavior, which called price
effect. But the higher price also makes dishonest behavior more intolerant, which renders
less acceptance by the consumer, which called quantity effect. The expert decides optimal
prices and optimal probability of dishonesty by balancing these two effects. Moreover,
we assume the consumer is risk-averse and purchase insurance in a competitive insurance
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market. While in Sulzle and Wambach’s model, the consumers are risk-neutral and their
coinsurance rate is exogenously given.
In addition, Bonroy, et al (2013)analyse the impact of consumer’s risk-aversion on
expert’s incentive to diagnosis. They show that the presence of risk aversion reduce
expert’s incentive to invest in diagnosis and thus cause mistreatment. This paper focuses
on the role of risk aversion on expert’s incentive for overtreatment and formally analyse
the effect of insurance as well.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard
credence goods model with risk-averse consumer and analyses the equilibrium. Section
3 extends the basic model by introducing the insurance company and the equilibria are
solved. Section 4 makes some discussions and then concludes.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Players and Payoff Function
There is a monopoly expert(she) and a consumer(he). The consumer has a problem r
either being minor m or serious S, r ∈ {m,S}. r = S with probability β, with β ∈ (0, 1).
If the consumer’s problem r ∈ {m,S} is resolved, the consumer could gain a gross of
Vr, otherwise he gets 0. The consumer is risk-averse and his utility function follows a
concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern form U(x) which is twice differentiable with U(0) = 0,
U
′
(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0, where x being the consumer’s net gain. So the consumer’s utility
is U(Vb−P ) if his problem b is resolved at price P , and U(−P ) if his problem is unresolved
with treatment at price P . The reserve utility of the consumer is U¯ > 0.
The expert can privately learn the nature of the consumer’s problem by costless di-
agnosis and then make a prescription d for the consumer: major treatment H or minor
treatment L,i.e, d ∈ {L,H}. Prescription d = H repairs both types of problems while
prescription d = L only repairs a minor problem. The cost of performing a treatment
d for the expert are Cd. Suppose the expert is a profit maximizer and her utility from
performing a treatment at price P is P − Cd, otherwise her payoff is 0. Meanwhile, we
also assume that overtreatment will induce the same cost of treating the major problem
for the expert2.
2This assumption can be easily extended to the situation that overtreatment only induce a friction of
cost for major treatment. overtreatment is actually the situation that the expert privately learns that
the consumer’s problem is minor, So the expert only need fix the consumer’s problem whilst make the
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Suppose that it is socially efficient to repair both problem with proper treatment while
not efficient to repair minor problem by major treatment,i.e.,0 < CL < Vm < CH < VS.
Suppose major treatment is potentially more profitable than minor treatment for the
expert3. Also, we assume that it is not optimal for the consumer to always accepting
major treatment, i.e, βU(VS −CH) + (1− β)U(Vm−CH) < U¯4. Furthermore, we restrict
any price list (PL, PH) to satisfy Pd ≥ Cd for all d ∈ {L,H}, which means that the expert
can not cross-subsidise between the two treatment.
Following the literature, we define the following terms
Definition 1. Liability: The resolution of consumer’s problem is verifiable costless ex
post. Verifiability: The type of treatment the consumer receives is verifiable costless.
By Liability, if the consumer’s problem is not resolved after treatment, the expert
could be heavily fined. Then, the expert could not providing minor treatment for the
consumer with major problem,i.e, undertreatment could be excluded. By Verifiability,
the expert can not provide a minor (major) treatment while charging a price for major
(minor) treatment,i.e, overcharging could be excluded. In the our model we assume both
the assumptions of liability and verifiability hold.
Timing of the Game. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The expert posts a price list (PL, PH).
2. Nature draws the consumer’s type. The consumer visits the expert. The expert
performs a diagnosis and prescribes a treatment d ∈ {∅, L,H} for the consumer. ∅
here means the expert could reject to treat the consumer.
3. The consumer decides whether accept treatment d or not. If the consumer accepts,
the treatment prescribed would be performed by the expert. If the problem is
resolved, the expert receives her payment otherwise get nothing5. The game ends
in other situations.
consumer believe that he have performed a major treatment. Therefore, overtreatment in some cases
may be less costly than actually performing a major treatment.
3We would like use the minor treatment as the base line to study the expert’s incentive to overtreat-
ment. Since there are only two cases, then it is a symmetric problem to focus on the expert’s incentive
to undertreatment,i.e, provide insufficiently minor treatment for major problem, which could only be
possible when the assumption liability defined below is not held.
4Other cases will be discussed in later sections.
5Here the payment for the expert is based on the resolution of the consumer’s problem, so the liability
holds. We think that it may be regarded as enough penalty for the expert’s undertreatment behaviour.
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2.2 Equilibrium
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is analyzed below. An equilibrium consists of the ex-
pert’s strategy, the consumer’s strategy, and the consumer’s beliefs over the nature of
problem, which satisfy the following:
1. The consumer’s strategy maximizes her expect payoff given her beliefs.
2. The expert’s strategy maximizes his expected utility given the consumer’s strategy.
3. The consumer’s beliefs are correct on the equilibrium path.
The consumer’s strategy specifies the acceptance probability regarding to the expert’s rec-
ommendation. Note that as long as the assumption liability holds, undertreatment would
be excluded as mentioned above. The expert would only recommend minor treatment for
the consumer with minor problem. And the consumer would believe that his problem is
indeed minor upon recommended minor treatment. Accepting the prescription at price
PL would bring the consumer with benefits of Vm, resulting in the consumer’s utility being
U(Vm − PL), while rejecting it retains the reserve utility U¯ .
Denote P¯ ∗L and P¯
∗
H that satisfy U(Vm − P¯ ∗L) = U¯ and U(VS − P¯ ∗H) = U¯ , respectively.
Then P¯ ∗L and P¯
∗
H are the maximal prices at which the consumer would accept the treatment
offer when he could make sure that his problem is minor and major, respectively. Any
prices larger than the maximal prices would make the consumer reject and no transaction
would be reached, which is suboptimal for the expert. So we restrict the prices with
PL ≤ P¯ ∗L and PH ≤ P¯ ∗H .
Then as long as PL ≤ P¯ ∗L with U(Vm − P¯ ∗L) = U¯ , the consumer would accept the
minor treatment prescription with probability one6. Denote λ as the probability of the
consumer accepting major treatment.
The expert’s strategy consists of posting a price list {PL, PH} and a prescription
strategy d ∈ {∅, L,H}. For the consumer with serious problem,i.e, r = S, the expert
has to prescribe major treatment (d = M) since the consumer’s payment is based on
the resolution of his problem and only major treatment could repair serious problem.
Let ρ be the probability of prescribing major treatment for the consumer with minor
problem,i.e.attempt to overtreat the consumer.
6Assume that the consumer would accept the prescription when he is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the offer.
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Lemma 1. There exists no equilibrium where the expert posts a single price PL = PH = P¯
or a price list {PL, PH} with PH ∈ [CH , CH + PL − CL).
Proof. The proof can be divided into two parts: the first part shows that there exists no
equilibrium with a single price PL = PH = P¯ and the second part proves that a price list
{PL, PH} with PH ∈ [CH , CH + PL − CL) can not be optimal for the expert.
1. Assume that there is indeed a equilibrium where the expert posts a single price
PL = PH = P¯ . If P¯ < CH , then the expert would reject the consumer with serious
problem. The consumer updates his belief that the expert would offer to treat him
only when his problem is minor. Then for the expert’s offer at such a single price, the
consumer believe that his problem is minor with probability one and expected gain
from the treatment is Vm. Therefore, the consumer would only accept the treatment
at price P¯ ≤ P¯ ∗ and reject any treatment at price P¯ > P¯ ∗. So the expert’s maximal
profits pim = (1 − β)(P¯ ∗ − CL). However, the expert can always post a price list
{PL, PH} with PL = P¯ ∗ and PH = CH + ξ (ξ → 0). Overtreatment is not profitable
for the expert under such a price list, then the consumer would accept both major
and minor treatment prescriptions with probability one. The expert’s profits are
βξ+ (1− β)(P¯ ∗−CL) > pim. Therefore, the single price list P¯ < CH is suboptimal.
If P¯ ≥ CH , although the expert would offer to treat the consumer in both states
but no information about the consumer’s problem could be updated from the price
list and expert’s recommendation, the consumer maintains his prior belief and the
expected utility from treatment is βU(VM − PH) + (1 − β)U(Vm − PH) < U¯ , then
the consumer would reject the treatment with probability one. Then the market
breaks down and the expert make no profits, which makes the price suboptimal.
2. For the price list {PL, PH} with PH ∈ [CH , CH + PL − CL), it is strictly dominated
strategy for the expert because the expert could strictly increase his profits by
posting a price list {PL, CH + PL − CL}. This is because the consumer holds the
belief that the expert would honestly treat him as long as PH ≤ CH +PL−CL and
both liability and verifiability holds7, so the consumer would accept the expert’s
recommendation, either major or minor treatment, with probability one. Then the
expert’s profits are β(PH −CH) + (1−β)(PL−CL). The profits under any price list
{PL, PH} with PH ∈ [CH , CH+PL−CL) are β(PH−CH)+(1−β)(PL−CL) < PL−CL,
7Assume that the expert would honestly treat the consumer when he is indifferent between honestly
treating and overtreating.
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the profits under price list {PL, PH} with PH = CH + PL − CL. Therefore, such a
price list is also suboptimal.
Lemma 1 shows that some constraints can be put on the equilibrium price. Firstly, a
single price is not feasible on the equilibrium. If the single price is too low to compensate
the expert’s cost of major treatment, the expert would reject treating the consumer with
major problem at the price. Then the consumer learns that only minor problem would
be repaired at the price based on this observation, so the consumer would only accepting
a maximal price that leave him reserve utility. The expert can get all the rents from the
consumer with minor problem but give up all the possible rents from the consumer with
major problem, but such a price can not be optimal because the expert could always post
a price list that get extra rents by treating the consumer with major problem. While if
the single price can cover the cost of major treatment. The price is too high to make the
consumer always reject the offer. Therefore, a single price is not optimal.
On the other hand, if the price list satisfies that the margin from major treatment is
no bigger than that from minor treatment, then the expert would behave honestly and
the consumer would accept the offer for certain. Given the consumer always accepting
expert’s offer, expert’s profits is increasing in both prices. Then any price lists that makes
the margin from major treatment smaller than that from minor treatment is dominated
by that equals the price margin.
From the two points, we could focus our attention on the price list {PL, PH} with
PH ≥ CH + PL − CL in the equilibrium analysis below.
Lemma 2 (Fully Overtreatment). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL−CL ≤ PH−CH ,
there exists no equilibrium where
ρ = 1, λ = 1. (1)
Proof. We shows the result by contradiction. If ρ = 1, no information is updated and
the consumer retains his prior belief that his problem is major with probability β. The
expected utility from accepting the treatment is βU(VM − PH) + (1 − β)U(Vm − PH).
Given the price PL −CL ≤ PH −CH and βU(VM −CH) + (1− β)U(Vm −CH) < U¯ , then
βU(VM − PH) + (1 − β)U(Vm − PH) < U¯ . Optimally, the consumer should reject the
treatment offer with probability one,i.e, λ = 0.
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The lemma 2 establishes that the fully overtreatment could not be a equilibrium. Since
fully overtreatment provides no information updating for the consumer about the nature
of the problem, the consumer retains his prior belief and his acceptance for price of major
treatment is constrained by such belief. As the price for major treatment is too high, the
consumer should reject such a offer with probability one8.
We next direct our attention to mixed strategy equilibrium. Given the price list
{PL, PH} with PL − CL ≤ PH − CH , we compute the consumer’s optimal acceptance
strategy λ at stage 3. Upon being recommending major treatment, the consumer would
update his belief about the nature of his problem and weigh the price of the treatment
and expected valuation from treatment. The expert would recommend major treatment
in two situations: one where the consumer’s problem is serious; the other where the expert
overtreats the consumer with minor problem, and the probability of the two situations is
β and (1 − β)ρ, respectively. According to Bayes’ rule, the consumer nurture the belief
that his problem is minor with probability (1−β)ρ
β+(1−β)ρ and major with probability
β
β+(1−β)ρ .
If the consumer rejects the expert’s recommendation, he would receive his reserve utility
which is U¯ , while if he accepts, his expected utility is
EU =
(1− β)ρU(Vm − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ +
βU(VS − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ (2)
Assume that ρˆ be the probability which makes EU = U¯ , so ρˆ makes the consumer
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the expert’s recommendation. By simple
calculations, ρˆ = β(U(VS−PH)−U¯)
(1−β)(U¯−U(Vm−PH)) . Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL − CL ≤
PH−CH , the consumer should choose his acceptance probability λ = 1 if ρ < ρˆ and λ = 0
if ρ > ρˆ. And if ρ = ρˆ, any λ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal for the consumer.
Backward, we consider the expert’s recommendation strategy at stage 2. For the
consumer with minor problem, the expert could either prescribe minor or major treat-
ment,i.e. overtreat or not. Given the price list {PL, PH}, if the expert treats the consumer
honestly,i.e, prescribe a minor treatment, she could make a profit of pi(H) = PL −CL for
sure, while if she overtreats the consumer,i.e, prescribe a unnecessary major treatment,
her expected profit is pi(F ) = λ(PH − CH). So the expert would always overtreats the
consumer if pi(F ) > pi(H) while honestly repair the consumer’s problem if pi(F ) < pi(H),
and he is indifferent between overtreatment and honest treatment if pi(F ) = pi(H).
8This argument holds because βU(VM − CH) + (1 − β)U(Vm − CH) < U¯ and PH ≥ CH . PH ≥ CH
because the expert lack of the commitment to provide major treatment by make a negative profit.
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Lemma 3 (Partial Overtreatment). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL−CL ≤ PH−CH ,
there exists a equilibrium where
λ∗ =
PL − CL
PH − CH , ρ
∗ =
β(U(VS − PH)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − PH)) (3)
and the expert’s expected payoff pi = (PL − CL)
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satisfies PL−CL ≤ PH−CH . Given r = m, the
expert receives pi(H) = PL−CL by recommending d = L and pi(F ) = λ(PH−CH) by
recommending d = H. Given the consumer’s strategy, pi(H) = pi(F ), then ρ ∈ [0, 1]
is optimal.
Given the expert’s strategy, the consumer who decline d = H would retain his
reserve utility U¯ and accept d = H would receive a utility
U(d = H, accept) =
(
(1− β)ρ∗U(Vm − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ∗ +
βU(VS − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ∗
)
= U¯ = U(d = H, reject). (4)
Then any λ ∈ [0, 1] is an optimal strategy for the consumer. Therefore, for the given
price list, the strategies of the expert and the consumer are mutually best responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (3) form an equilibrium. For λ ∈ [0, 1], it must hold that
PH > CH and PH − CH ≥ PL − CL. For ρˆ ∈ [0, 1], it is necessary that PH ≤ P¯ ∗H .
3. Note that a prescription of d = H is rejected with probability λ. The ex ante payoffs
of the expert are
Π = β(PH − CH) PL − CL
PH − CH + (1− β)(PL − CL) = PL − CL (5)
The lemma 3 shows that there indeed exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the consumer’s strategy makes the expert indifferent between overtreating and honestly
treating, whilst the expert’s strategy makes the consumer indifferent between accepting
and rejecting major treatment recommendation.
Lastly, we study the optimal pricing strategy for the expert given the optimal strategies
of both players in continuation game and the following equilibria could be found.
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Proposition 1. Under the assumption of liability and verifiability, there exists a con-
tinuum of equilibria where the expert posts the price list {P¯ ∗L, P ∗H} with P ∗H ∈ [P¯ ∗L +CH −
CL, P¯
∗
H ]. The expert would honestly treat the consumer with major problem while attempt
to overtreat the consumer with minor problem with probability
β(U(VS−P ∗H)−U¯)
(1−β)(U¯−U(Vm−P ∗H))
and hon-
estly treat the consumer with minor problem with probability 1 − β(U(VS−P ∗H)−U¯)
(1−β)(U¯−U(Vm−P ∗H))
. The
consumer would accept minor treatment prescription with probability one and major one
with
P¯ ∗L−CL
P ∗H−CH .
Proof. In lemma 3, the expert’s expected payoff pi = (PL − CL). Obviously, the expert’s
expected profits are strictly increasing in PL while constant at PH . Then the expert
should choose the price for minor treatment PL as large as possible while decide the price
for major treatment as long as the consumer would accept.
Since the consumer would accept any pricePL ≤ P¯ ∗L for minor treatment, thus the
optimal price for minor treatment P ∗L = P¯
∗
L. While for the price of major treatment,
PL − CL ≤ PH − CH gives that P ∗H ≥ CH + PL − CL. Moreover, the highest price that
the consumer is willing to pay for his serious problem repaired is P¯ ∗H , then P
∗
H < P¯
∗
H .
In brief, P ∗H ∈ [P¯ ∗L + CH − CL, P¯ ∗H ]. Therefore, the optimal price list is {P¯ ∗L, P ∗H} with
P ∗H ∈ [P¯ ∗L + CH − CL, P¯ ∗H ].
In proposition 1, both the expert and the consumer play mixed strategy and their
strategies are mutual best responses. The probability of overtreatment by the expert
makes the consumer indifferent between accepting or rejecting the treatment offer, whilst
the consumer’s acceptance probability equate the expert’s profits from overtreamtent and
honest treatment. Notice that the expert would still overtreat the consumer with strictly
positive probability even when the price margin of the two treatments is equal, which
indicates that ”equal price margin principle” proposed in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)
fail when the consumer is risk-averse. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) also show that the
assumption of liability and verifiability can ensure social efficiency but the equilibrium
outcome in proposition 1 shows that this prediction fails as well with risk-averse consumer
in the market.
Next, we could investigate how the degree of consumer’s risk-aversion ceteris paribus
affects the expert’s fraudulent behaviours.
Corollary 1. Given the price list {P¯ ∗L, P ∗H} with P ∗H ∈ [P¯ ∗L +CH −CL, P¯ ∗H) in the equilib-
rium9, the optimal overtreatment probability ρ∗ decreases with the coefficient of absolute
9Except the case with the price list {P¯ ∗L, P¯ ∗H} because the expert would honestly treat the consumer
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risk aversion (CARA). Extremely, when CARA tends toward infinity, ρ∗ = 010.
Proof. Given some price list {P¯ ∗L, P ∗H} posted by the expert, the optimal probability of
overtreatment for the expert
ρ∗ =
β(U(VS − P ∗H)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − P ∗H))
=
βU(VS − P ∗H) + (1− β)U(Vm − P ∗H)− U¯
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − P ∗H))
+ 1
=
U(βVS + (1− β)Vm − P ∗H − γ)− U¯
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − P ∗H))
+ 1 (6)
where γ denote the certain equivalence that make U(βVS + (1 − β)Vm − P ∗H − γ) =
βU(VS − P ∗H) + (1− β)U(Vm − P ∗H).
It is proved that a larger coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) means larger
certainty equivalence11. It is not hard to notice that ρ∗ decreases in γ, and therefore ρ∗
decreases with CARA.
For the extreme case, when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion tends toward
infinity, the consumer’s expected utility function takes a form of maximin12. Then given
the expert’s recommendation for major treatment, the consumer’s utility U(PH , accept) =
min{U(Vm−PH), U(VS−PH)} = U(Vm−PH)) if the expert overtreats the consumer with
positive probability, while U(PH , accept) = U(VS − PH) if the expert honestly treats.
Given our assumption Vm < CH , then the consumer would always reject the expert’s offer
if the expert overtreats the consumer with any, even extremely small, probability because
U(Vm − PH) < U¯ holds for any PH ≥ CH . And the expert’s expected profits from the
strategy pi1 = (1− β)(1− ρ∗)(P¯ ∗ − CH).
On the other hand, if the expert honestly repairs the consumer’s problem with U(VS−
PH) ≤ U¯ and PH > CH , the consumer would accept the offer with probability one. Then
the expert’s expected profits pi2 = (1 − β)(P¯ ∗ − CH) + β(P ∗H − CH). Obviously, pi2 > pi1
and honest treatment is optimal for the expert.
This result is quite interesting but intuitive. The expert’s overtreatment behaviors
impose uncertainties on the consumer. When the consumer becomes more risk-averse,
he would obtain less utilities from accepting a major treatment offer and become more
likely to reject it. Therefore, a more risk-averse consumer is less tolerant with the expert’s
regardless to the degree of consumer’s risk aversion in that case.
10the result still holds when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is replaced by the coefficient of
relative risk aversion(CRRA).
11See THEROEM 1 in Pratt (1964) for the proof in details.
12See the Maximin Criterion in chapter 2(Laffont (1989)).
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fraud behaviours, which in turn on the equilibrium discipline the expert and result in less
overtreatments. And if the consumer is extremely risk-averse and worries about the worst
situation, then his utility function takes a form of max-min, and he would show zero
tolerance for the expert’s overtreatment behaviours, which would lead zero acceptance
probability for major treatment if the expert overtreats the consumer with any, even very
small, possibilities. Given the consumer’s strategy, the expert would optimally choose not
to overtreat the consumer because honestly prescribing major treatment at least brings
positive profits whilst cause no decrease of the profits from minor treatment. Therefore,
the expert would behave honestly if visited by a extremely risk-averse consumers.
In the next sections, we extend the basic model by entitling the consumer with insur-
ance option.
3 Analysis with Insurance Option
In the previous section, we have shown that the consumer’s utility differs in different
states on the equilibrium. If the problem is minor, he would obtain the reserve utility U¯ .
If the problem is a major one, the consumer is honestly treated with probability 1−ρ∗ and
receive a utility of U(VM −PH) > U¯ whilst he is overtreated with probability ρ∗ and gain
a utility of U(Vm − PH) < U¯ . Therefore, the consumer would obtain a expected utility
ρ∗U(Vm − PH) + (1 − ρ∗)U¯ < U¯ in the state of minor problem while U(VM − PH) > U¯
if his problem is major. Therefore, the consumer is not fully insured by the expert and
have an incentive to purchase insurance from a third party.
As the consumer would obtain a utility below the reserve utility in states of minor
problem while one above reserve utility with major problem, then the problem being
minor is the ”bad thing” for the consumer while a major problem is the ”good thing”.
However, since both the insurer and the consumer can not learn exactly whether the
consumer’s problem is minor or major, the insurance could not be based on the states.
But the price list posted by the expert is common knowledge for all, then the insurance
can be based on the price list.
In this section, we assume that there exists a perfectly competitive insurance mar-
ket. After the expert posts the price list, the insurer posts the insurance scheme. The
consumer can purchase some insurances before he visits the expert13. The insurer pro-
13Here we assume that the price list posted by the expert is common knowledge, which can be well
justified by the reality. Besides, in our setting, we assume that the consumer must have a problem, being
13
vides a insurance plan with (k, α), k denote the price of the insurance or the amount of
insurance with unit price and α means the compensation to the consumer. The insurer
determine the insurance scheme (k, α) after the expert posts the price list. If the consumer
is charged with the price for a minor treatment, the insurer should pay a compensation
of α to the consumer, while pay nothing if the consumer being charged with the price for
major treatment.
Timing of New Game. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The expert posts a price list (PL, PH).
2. The insurance company provide a actually fair insurance plan (k, α). The consumer
decide to buy k amount of insurance with k ≥ 0.
3. Nature draws the consumer’s type. The consumer visits the expert. The expert
performs a diagnosis and prescribes a treatment d ∈ {L,H} for the consumer.
4. The consumer decides whether accept treatment d or not. If d = m and the con-
sumer accepts, the treatment prescribed would be performed by the expert, the
consumer receive a compensation of α from the insurer and pay the treatment price
to the expert based on the resolution of his problem. If d = M and the consumer
accepts, the treatment is performed and the consumer get no compensation and pay
the expert if his problem is repaired. The game ends if the consumer rejects expert’s
offer.
The notation in the previous section will be retained in the following analysis. As
before, there exists no equilibrium with single price due to the same argument in Lemma
1. Therefore, only price list should be under our concern. We subdivide the analysis into
two cases, one with PL − CL ≤ PH − CH and the other with PL − CL > PH − CH
3.1 PL − CL ≤ PH − CH
Firstly, we study the consumer’s optimal acceptance strategy at stage 4. Given the price
list {PL, PH} withPL −CL ≤ PH −CH and kˆ amount of insurance purchased in previous
minor or major. It can be easily extended to the case with healthy consumer but does not change the
essence of the problem under concern.
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stage, upon recommended minor treatment, accepting the offer would bring a utility
U(d = L, accept) = U(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ), (7)
while rejecting will reserve U¯ .
On the other hand, the consumer would update his belief about the nature of his
problem as before upon recommended a major treatment. The expert would recommend
major treatment in two situations: one where the consumer’s problem is serious; the other
where the expert overtreats the consumer with minor problem, and the probability of the
two situations is β and (1−β)ρ, respectively. According to Bayes’ rule, the consumer forms
the belief that his problem is minor with probability (1−β)ρ
β+(1−β)ρ and major with probability
β
β+(1−β)ρ . If the consumer accepts the offer, his expected utility is
U(d = H, accept) =
(1− β)ρU(Vm − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ +
βU(VS − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ , (8)
and,again, rejecting will bring U¯.
Denote ρˆ
′
that satisfy U(d = H, accept) = U(d = H, reject),i.e,
(1− β)ρˆ′U(Vm − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρˆ′ +
βU(VS − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρˆ′ = U¯, (9)
then simple calculations lead to ρˆ
′
= β((VS−kˆ−PH)−U¯)
(1−β)(U¯−U(Vm−kˆ−PH)) . Optimally, the consumer would
choose his acceptance probability λ = 1 if ρ < ρˆ
′
, λ ∈ [0, 1] if ρ = ρˆ′ , and λ = 0 if ρ > ρˆ′ .
Backward, the expert’s prescription strategy at stage 3 is the same as that in the
analysis of previous section.
Lemma 4 (Partial Overtreatment). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL−CL ≤ PH−CH
and 0 ≤ kˆ ≤ P¯ ∗H − PH , there exists a equilibrium where
λ∗1 =
PL − CL
PH − CH , ρ
∗
1 =
β(U(VS − kˆ − PH)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − kˆ − PH))
(10)
and the expert’s expected payoff pi1 = (PL − CL)
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satisfies PL−CL ≤ PH−CH . Given r = m, the
expert receives pi(H) = PL−CL by recommending d = L and pi(F ) = λ1(PH −CH)
by recommending d = H. Given the consumer’s strategy, pi(H) = pi(F ) because
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θ > 1, then ρ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal.
Given the strategies of the expert, declining d = H gets reserve utility U¯ while
accepting d = H brings a utility
U(d = H, accept) =
(
(1− β)ρ∗1U(Vm − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ∗1
+
βU(VS − kˆ − PH)
β + (1− β)ρ∗1
)
= U¯ = U(d = H, reject).
Then any λ ∈ [0, 1] is an optimal strategy for the consumer. Therefore, for the
given price list, the expert’s strategy and the consumer’s strategy are mutual best
responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (10) form an equilibrium. For λ ∈ [0, 1], it must hold that
PH > CH and PH−CH ≥ PL−CL. For ρ∗1 ∈ [0, 1], it is necessary that kˆ ≤ P¯ ∗H−PH .
3. Note that a prescription of d = H is rejected with probability λ. The expert’s
expected payoffs are
Π1 = β(PH − CH) PL − CL
PH − CH + (1− β)(PL − CL) = PL − CL (11)
Lemma 5 (Optimal Insurance Choice). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL − CL ≤
PH − CH and players’ strategy in (10), the consumer’s optimal insurance choice
k∗1 = P¯
∗
H − PH (12)
and then ρ∗1 = 0 under the consumer’s optimal insurance choice.
Proof. In lemma 5, the consumer’s expected utility is
EU(kˆ, PL, PH) = λ
∗
1
(
βU(VS − kˆ − PH) + (1− β)ρ∗1U(Vm − kˆ − PH)
)
+ (1− λ∗1)(β + (1− β)ρ∗1)U¯ + (1− β)(1− ρ∗1)U(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ)
= (β + (1− β)ρ∗1)U¯ + (1− β)(1− ρ∗1)U(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ) (13)
The second equation holds by using definitions of ρ∗1. As the insurance market is perfectly
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competitive, zero expected profits condition ensures that,
k − (1− β)(1− ρ∗1)α = 0 (14)
then α = k
(1−β)(1−ρ∗1) .
Therefore, the consumer’s maximization program subject to the insurer’s zero expected
profit is reduced to
argmax EU(kˆ, PL, PH)
s.t. α =
k
(1− β)(1− ρ∗1)
, ρ∗1 =
β(U(VS − kˆ − PH)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − kˆ − PH))
(15)
Take both αˆ and ρ∗1 as a function of kˆ, denoted as αˆ(kˆ) and ρ
∗
1(kˆ), respectively. Note that
EU(kˆ, PL, PH) is differentiable. By taking partial derivative with respect to kˆ, we get
∂EU
∂kˆ
= (1− β)
(
ρ∗1
′
[U¯ − U(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ)] + (1− ρ∗1)(αˆ
′ − 1)U ′(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ)
)
(16)
Due to U¯−U(Vm− kˆ−PL+ αˆ) < 0 and ρ∗′1 (kˆ) < 0, then the first term in equation (16)
is positive. Moreover, αˆ
′ − 1 = 1−ρ∗1+kρ∗1
(1−β)(1−ρ∗1) − 1 > 0 and U
′
(·) > 0, the second term is also
positive. Therefore, ∂EU
∂kˆ
> 0. So the consumer’s expected utility is strictly increasing in
the amount of insurance kˆ purchased. Since 0 ≤ kˆ ≤ P¯ ∗H − PH , the optimal amount of
insurance k∗1 = P¯
∗
H − PH .
Lemma 6 (Pricing Strategy). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL−CL ≤ PH−CH and
players’ strategies in lemma 4 and 5, the optimal price list for the expert {P ∗L, P ∗H} is
P ∗L = βP¯
∗
H +(1−β)P¯ ∗L−β(CH−CL), P ∗H = βP¯ ∗H +(1−β)P¯ ∗L+(1−β)(CH−CL) (17)
and λ∗1 = 1 and the expert’s maximal profit pi
∗ = βP¯ ∗H + (1 − β)P¯ ∗L − βCH − (1 − β)CL
under the price list.
Proof. We study the optimal pricing strategy for the price list {PL, PH} with PL −CL ≤
PH − CH , the expert’s profit pi = PL − CL, which is strictly monotonically increasing in
PL while invariant to PH .
To ensure that the consumer accepts minor treatment prescription, U(d = m, accept) =
U(Vm − k∗ + α∗ − PL) ≥ U(d = m, reject) = U¯ . Then the optimal PL should make that
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U(Vm − k∗ + α∗ − P ∗L) = U¯ . Recall that U(Vm − P¯ ∗L) = U¯ , then U(Vm − k∗ + α∗ − P ∗L) =
U(Vm − P¯ ∗L). It follows that P ∗L + k∗ − α∗ = P¯ ∗L. Given k∗1 chosen by the consumer, the
expert’s optimal overtreatment strategy in lemma 4
ρ∗1 =
β(U(VS − k∗ − PH)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − kˆ − PH))
=
β(U(VS − P¯ ∗H)− U¯)
(1− β)(U¯ − U(Vm − kˆ − PH))
= 0 (18)
It follows that α∗1 =
P¯ ∗H−PH
(1−β)(1−ρ∗1) =
P¯ ∗H−PH
(1−β) . Plugging k
∗ = P¯ ∗H − PH and α∗ = P¯
∗
H−PH
(1−β) ,
P ∗L = P¯
∗
L +
β
1− β (P¯
∗
H − PH). (19)
Furthermore, P ∗L − CL ≤ P ∗H − CH . To maximize PL, P ∗H should take the lower bound,
and P ∗H = P
∗
L+CH−CL. Substituting P ∗H into equation 19, then P ∗L = βP¯ ∗H +(1−β)P¯ ∗L−
β(CH − CL) and P ∗H = βP¯ ∗H + (1− β)P¯ ∗L + (1− β)(CH − CL).
Given the optimal price list, λ∗ = P
∗
L−CL
P ∗H−CH = 1. The expert’s maximal profits pi
∗ =
P ∗L − CL = βP¯ ∗H + (1− β)P¯ ∗L − (βCH + (1− β)CL).
3.2 PL − CL > PH − CH
Lemma 7 (Efficient Outcome). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL − CL > PH − CH ,
there exists a equilibrium where
λ∗2 = 1, ρ
∗
2 = 0, (20)
and the expert’s expected payoff pi2 = (1− β)(PL − CL) + β(PH − CH).
Proof. 1. Suppose the posted price list satisfies PL − CL > PH − CH . since overtreat-
ment is not profitable for the expert, then honest treatment is optimal for the
expert,i.e, ρ∗2 = 0.
Given that the expert always honestly offer the treatment, the consumer would
always accept the offer, i.e, λ∗2 = 1.
Therefore, under the given price list, the expert’s strategy and the consumer’s s-
trategy are mutual best responses.
2. Suppose the strategies in (3) form an equilibrium. For λ = 1, it must hold that
PL ≤ P¯ ∗L + αˆ− kˆ and PH ≤ P¯ ∗H . For ρ = 0, it is necessary that PL−CL > PH −CH .
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3. Since the consumer would always accept the recommendation, the expert’s expected
payoffs are
Π2 = β(PH − CH) + (1− β)(PL − CL) (21)
Lemma 8 (Optimal Insurance Choice). Given the price list {PL, PH} with PL − CL >
PH − CH and players’ strategy in (20), the optimal insurance choice for the consumer
k∗2 = (1− β)(VS − Vm + PL − PH) (22)
Proof. In lemma 8, the consumer’s expected utility is
EU = βU(VS − kˆ − PH) + (1− β)U(Vm − kˆ − PL + αˆ) (23)
As the previous case, given the expert’s optimal overtreatment probability ρ∗2 on the
equilibrium path, zero expected profit in competitive equilibrium would ensure that
k = (1− β)(1− ρ∗2)α. (24)
therefore α = k
(1−β)(1−ρ∗2) =
k
1−β . Optimally, the consumer maximize his expected utility
subject to the insurer’s zero expected profits constraint. As the insurance is actually fair,
the consumer would fully insure for the risk. Then the consumer’s optimal insurance
choice is given by
VS − k∗2 − PH = Vm − k∗2 − PL + α∗2 (25)
Solving k∗2 by combining this condition and equation (24), k
∗
2 = (1−β)(VS−Vm+PL−PH)
and α∗2 = VS − Vm + PL − PH .
Lemma 9 (Pricing Strategy). Given the optimal strategy of both consumer and expert in
lemma 7 and 8, the expert’s optimal pricing strategy {P ∗L, P ∗H} should satisfy
βP ∗H + (1− β)P ∗L = βP¯ ∗H + (1− β)P¯ ∗L, P ∗L − CL > P ∗H − CH (26)
and the expert’s maximal profit pi∗2 = βP¯
∗
H + (1− β)P¯ ∗L − βCH − (1− β)CL.
Proof. The expert’s profits pi2 = βPH + (1− β)PL − βCH − (1− β)CL, which are strictly
increasing in both PL and PH . Then the pricing strategy should make the consumer
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indifferent between accepting and rejecting the recommendation and leave no rents for
the consumer, which gives rise to
PL = α
∗
2 − k∗2 + P¯ ∗L PH = P¯ ∗H − k∗2 (27)
Plugging k∗2 and α
∗
2 into the equations, we get βPH + (1 − β)PL = βP¯ ∗H + (1 − β)P¯ ∗L.
Essentially, the two conditions in equation 27 are the same. Since the consumer would
always purchase fully insurance, the consumer would retain the same utility in both states
and the difference of utility between the two states under the price list would be cancelled
out by insurance. Also, the optimal price list should meet the precondition, that is,
P ∗L − CL > P ∗H − CH . The expert’s profit follows.
Proposition 2. Under the assumption of liability and verifiability, there exists two sets
of equilibria where
1. the expert post a price list {P ∗L, P ∗H} with P ∗L = βP¯ ∗H +(1−β)P¯ ∗L−β(CH−CL), P ∗H =
βP¯ ∗H+(1−β)P¯ ∗L+(1−β)(CH−CL), and the consumer purchase a mount of insurance
k∗1 = (1− β)(P¯ ∗H − P¯ ∗L − CH + CL).
2. the expert posts the price list {P ∗L, P ∗H} with βP ∗H + (1 − β)P ∗L = βP¯ ∗H + (1 − β)P¯ ∗L
and P ∗L − CL > P ∗H − CH , the consumer would purchase a mount of insurance
k∗2 = (1− β)(VS − Vm + PL − PH).
In both sets of equilibria, the expert would honestly treat the consumer in both states, and
the consumer would accept both minor and major treatment with probability one.
Proof. Comparing the expert’s payoffs in lemma 6 and 9, the expert would achieve the
same maximal amount of profits, which is βP¯ ∗H+(1−β)P¯ ∗L−βCH−(1−β)CL. Furthermore,
the expert would always honestly treat the consumer and the consumer always accept the
expert’s offer,i.e, λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = 1 and ρ
∗
1 = ρ
∗
2 = 0. Therefore, both optimal pricing strategies
in lemma 6 and 9 with corresponding optimal strategy in the continuation game form a
equilibrium of the game. And the social efficiency could be achieved, the expert would
obtain all the social surplus from the transaction.
From the proposition 2, we show that the social efficiency could be achieved under
both situations when the consumer could buy insurance in a competitive insurance market.
The expert’s profits is maximized and the consumer’s problem is resolved with probability
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one. The logic behind the preferable result is that the consumer would fully insure himself
in a competitive market, and then the consumer could always adjust his utility between
the two treatment recommendation. Essentially, the consumer now have only one states
and one utility under whatever the expert recommendation. Then anticipating that the
consumer would buy full insurance, the expert would post the price list that make the
consumer in the state indifferent between accepting or rejecting his recommendation,
repair the consumer’s problem honestly and grab all surplus at the same time. Therefore,
the equilibrium ends up with the social efficiency outcome.
Without insurance option, the consumer could not cross-subsides himself under minor
treatment and major treatment, then his decision under minor treatment and major treat-
ment is separated, and he would only accept the recommendation with expected utility
no lower than his reserve utility under each separate case. While with insurance option,
the consumer could align the two choice into one and save in the good situation for case
of the ”bad thing” happening, which induce the consumer not restricted within accep-
tance strategy with respect to the expert’s recommendation. the consumer could accept a
treatment with expected utility lower than reserve utility and then receive compensation
from the insurance company.
When the price list gives rise to more profits from major treatment than minor treat-
ment, corresponding to first case in the proposition, the expert’s profits equal to the price
margin from minor treatment due to the consumer’s optimal acceptance probability on
the equilibrium. Then, the expert would charge as much as possible for minor treatment.
If the consumer purchase no insurance, the price for minor treatment maximizes at the
price that leave the consumer with reserve utility after having minor problem repaired.
While now the consumer could buy insurance and he would purchase as much amount
insurance as he can because the insurance could not only alleviate the risk he face but also
mitigate the expert’s fraud problem. So the consumer now could receive compensation
from the insurance company when he accept minor treatment, then the price for minor
treatment could be bigger and maximize at the price which makes the consumer indiffer-
ent between accepting or rejecting the offer with minor problem resolved and receiving
the compensation from the insurance company. Then the expert’s optimal price for minor
treatment is that price. But, the amount of insurance the consumer could purchase in
insurance market is constrained by the residuals from having his problem repaired with
major treatment and paying the price for major treatment. In other word, the money
that the consumer could save for the ”bad thing” is restricted by the money that he left
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when the ”good thing” happens. Therefore, the expert could use the insurance that the
consumer purchase as the tool that grab the surplus from major treatment by minor treat-
ment. Since the consumer would fully insurance himself, then the consumer put aside all
his surplus from having major problem repaired for minor treatment. As the compensa-
tion is based on the price paid, then the consumer could not get compensation even when
he is overtreatment, but at same time he has already used all the surplus from having
major problem repaired to purchase insurance, and then the consumer has no tolerance
of overtreatment. The results follows.
As to the second case in the proposition, the argument is similar. The insurance acts
as the tunnel by which the expert could transit the surplus from major treatment to
minor treatment, and then the expert captures all the surplus with only minor treatment.
Since now all the surplus goes to the expert’s pocket, the expert’s incentive is aligned
with social efficiency and he would post the price list and prescribe to ensure that the
consumer always accepts the treatment. Therefore, social efficiency could be realised.
4 Discussions and Conclusions
In the previous sections, we assume that βU(VS−CH)+(1−β)U(Vm−CH) < U¯ , then fully
overtreatment is not possible in the equilibrium. While if βU(VS −CH) + (1− β)U(Vm−
CH) ≥ U¯ , the expert could post a single price P¯ > CH to provide fully insurance for
the consumer. Specifically, assume that the expert post a single price P¯ > CH , the
expert would repair consumer’s problem, either minor or major, under the single price.
The optimal single price could be set such that βU(VS − P¯ ∗) + (1 − β)U(Vm − P¯ ∗) =
U(βVS + (1 − β)Vm − P¯ ∗ − γ) = U¯ , with γ being the certainty equivalence. Then P¯ ∗ =
βVS + (1− β)Vm − γ. Under the optimal single price, the consumer would always accept
the expert’s recommendation and the expert’s profits are maximized as the transaction
could be reached with probability one and all surplus from the transaction is captured by
the expert.
Therefore, cutting down the expert’s cost of treatment or improving the expert’s pro-
ductivity of treatment to some threshold could avoid the social inefficiency induced by the
risk-aversion of consumer when the assumptions of both liability and verifiability hold.
However, the expert’s cost may differ from each other, some experts are efficient enough
while others may be not14. Furthermore, there always exists some treatments that the
14We study the impact of expert’s private information about its treatment cost on the market perfor-
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expert is not efficient enough and then the expert can not provide fully insurance for the
consumer. Thus, the situation under concern in this paper is pretty general.
Conclusion In this paper, we study the impact of consumer’s risk-aversion on the
expert’s incentive for overtreatment and the efficiency of credence goods market when
both liability and verifiability holds in the basic model. Then, we extend the model by
introducing a competitive insurance company, and investigate the consumer’s optimal
insurance choices and its effect on the expert’s fraud behaviour and social welfare on the
equilibrium.
In the basic model, we show that the consumer’s risk aversion would induce expert’s
overtreatment behaviours and thus lead to social inefficiency even when both liability
and verifiability holds. But the frequency of overtreatment by the expert decreases with
the degree of consumer’s risk-aversion or the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. When
the consumer is extremely risk-averse and the consumer’s utility function takes a form of
max-min, the expert would always honestly treat the consumer and the market is socially
efficient.
In the extensive model with a competitive insurance company, we show that the expert
would always behave honestly and social efficiency can always be achieved. Two sets
of equilibrium outcomes divided by expert’s pricing strategy could be specified. When
the expert posts a price list with price margin from major treatment being larger than
that from minor treatment, the expert’s equilibrium profits equal to the price margin
from minor treatment and the consumer would purchase as much insurance as possible.
Interestingly, the expert could grab all the social surplus facilitated by the insurance
purchased by the consumer, acting as the tunnel that transports the consumer’s surplus
from major problem repaired to minor treatment. Optimally, the consumer’s insurance
choice would make the expert honestly treat his problem, and in turn the expert post a
optimal price list to capture all the social surplus, and the social efficiency is implemented
in the equilibrium.
The other equilibrium outcome relates to the situation where the experts posts a price
list with profits from major treatment being smaller than that of minor treatment. Under
such a price list, the expert credibly commits to honestly repair consumer’s problem, and
then the consumer would purchase full insurance and ends up with the same utility level
no matter which type his problem may be. Again, the insurance is a surplus-grabbing
mance in another paper.
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device. Since the consumer would always purchase full insurance, then obtaining all the
surplus in one situation(e.x.minor problem) means getting all the surplus in these two
situation. Therefore, the expert only need post a price list that make the consumer with
minor problem is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the treatment offer, and
then obtains all possible surplus. More importantly, the expert indeed has the incentive
to post such a price list as a honesty signal because all possible surplus could be captured
under the price list.
Nevertheless, the results is based on some assumptions. In the model, we assume that
the insurance market is completely competitive, and then the insurance is actually fair. We
anticipate that the market may be not socially efficient any more if the insurance company
have some monopoly power. Intuitively, the consumer would not purchase full insurance
even in the second set of equilibrium outcome above and he would be under-insured.
Although the insurance could still acts as tunnel for the experts, there exists loss of
surplus in the transportation since the insurance company would obtain some consumer’s
surplus. Depending on the share captured by the insurance company, committing to
honestly treatment may be not optimal for the expert and the equilibrium outcome is
uncertain.
On the other hand, the consumer may be heterogeneous with respect to risk-aversion.
Our basic model have show that the expert’s probability of overtreatment decreases with
the degree of consumer’s risk-aversion. With consumer’s risk-heterogeneity, the less risk-
averse consumer would have the incentive to pretend to be more risk-averse. This may give
rise to screening problem for the expert. While if the insurance company is in position,
then risk-heterogeneity may also bring about selection problem for the insurance company.
And it might be interesting to study the fraud problem of expert mingled with the selection
problem. All these problems are interesting while remains unanswered in the literature,
which point out the direction for future researches.
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